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Introduction 
This paper deals with the question why the member countries of the CFA franc zone participate in 
that currency area. The CFA franc zone is a currency area in west and central Africa, with the special 
features that its currency is pegged to the French franc at a fixed rate1, and that France is involved 
in the institutional arrangements which underlie the currency area. 
The CFA franc zone has several interesting aspects. In this paper we deal with the question why its 
member countries participate. We focus on economie motives for membership in the CFA zone, and 
pay no attention to other motives based on social and historical factors. According to literature on 
optimal currency areas, an area with large intraregional trade, and a flexible price and wage system 
is most suitable for establishment of a currency area. However, intraregional trade in the CFA franc 
zone is low, while prices and wages are quite rigid. Hence, traditional theory can not successfully 
explain existence of the CFA franc zone. 
This conclusion is not new, and several explanation for existence of the CFA franc zone have been 
advanced. These explanations concentrate on France's role in the system, elimination of exchange rate 
risk for trade with France, a reduction of exchange rate risk for trade with the rest of the EC, and 
the credibility of policies implemented by the CFA governments. 
In this paper, we hypothesize mat membership of the CFA zone may positively influence country risk 
assessment. This being the case, governments could be interested in participating in the CFA zone 
to lower risk premiums on loans originating outside the CFA zone to its country. Lower risk 
premiums imply a larger opportunity for obtaining short and long term credits. In this paper, we 
investigate this possibility theoretically. In a later paper, we will try to corroborate our theoretical 
hypotheses with empirical research. 
This paper is set up as follows. In section 1, we discuss the development and institutional 
arrangements of the CFA zone. In section 2, we summarize literature on optimal currency areas, and 
we conclude that what we call the "traditional optimal currency area theory" has little to offer in 
explanation of the existence of the CFA franc zone. We subsequently deal with alteraative 
explanations which have been offered, with special reference to the CFA franc zone. In section 3 we 
discuss country risk analysis (in genaral). Country risk analysis in its basic form consists of weighted 
summation of a country's score on a few indicators of a country's ability and willingness to repay its 
debt. In section 4, we discuss the influence of membership in the CFA franc zone on both the score 
on each indicator and its interpretation (possible influence on the country risk analysis). Section 5 
concludes. 
1
 On january 12, 1994, the parity of the CFA franc to the French franc was changed for the first time in history. The 
circumstances which lead to the devaluation are described in the appendix. 
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Section 1. Historical evolution and institutions of the CFA franc zone. 
In this section we deal with the historical evolution of the CFA franc zone and the development of 
its institutions. First, we describe the origins of the CFA franc zone. Then we discuss each of the 
subzones separately. We end with a discussion of the monetary arrangements which serve to guarantee 
convertibility and parity of the CFA franc. 
The origin of the CFA franc zone 
The Franc zone emerged in the '30s when France created one single currency for her overseas 
colonies. That currency was pegged to the French franc. After the Second World War many of the 
currencies were united in either the CFA franc (Colonies Francaise d'Afrique) or CPF franc (Colonies 
Francaises du Pacifique). After their independence in the early 1960s most of the former colonies 
choose to continue their monetary cooperation with France. The CFA franc zone, part of the larger 
franc zone ("la zone franc"), is not a monolithic entity; it consists in fact of two separate zones, the 
Central African Monetary Area (CAMA) and the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). 
As appears from table 1.1 the CFA franc zone nowadays consist only of African countries.2 The 
location of the members of the CFA franc zone is shown in figure 1. Some countries that left the 
CFA franc zone created their own, free floating currency3, whereas others created their own currency 
which is also still pegged to the French franc; in the latter case, in contrast with the CFA zone 
members, the French authorities are not involved.4 
The historical and institutional development of the two subzones since 1960 
WAMU 
In 1962 Benin, Burkina Faso (then still called Upper Volta), Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger 
and Senegal together established the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). The composition of 
the WAMU has changed over time, as Mali left and rejoined the WAMU (in 1962 and 1984 
respectively), Mauritania left in 1973, and Togo joined the WAMU in 1963. 
The origin of the WAMU's central bank goes back to the mid 1950s. In 1959 it obtained its name 
which it still carries: the "Banque Centrale des Etats de 1'Afrique de 1'Ouest" (BCEAO). 
CAMA 
Five countries has been member of the Central African Monetary Area (CAMA) right from the 
beginning in 1962: the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Gabon. In 1985 the 
sixth member, Equatorial Guinee, joined.5 The origin of its central bank dates also back to mid 1950. 
In 1959 it obtained the name "Banque Centrale des Etats de 1'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun" 
(BCEAEC). In 1972, after some organisational changes it got it's current name, Banque des Etats de 
2
 This has not always been the case. Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, lying in the Northern Atlantic Ocean, for example took 
also part in this system. In 1975 they left the CFA franc zone, after which the French franc became legal tender. 
3
 Madagascar in 1963 and Mauritania in 1973. 
4
 Since 1981 the Comoro franc is legal tender at the Comoro Islands, with an similar rate of exchange as the CFA franc 
has to the French franc, which was maintained until january 12, 1994. 
5
 Equatorial Guinee was the first non-former French colony to become part of the CFA franc zone. Thus, the CFA franc 
zone does no longer consist of French colonies only. 
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1'Afrique Centrale (BEAC).6 
Institutional development 
In the early 1970 some institutional changes took place in the WAMU (in 1974) as well as in the 
CAMA (in 1972). The main goal of the reform was to "Africanise" the institutions: to obtain more 
African responsibility and influence in policymaking and coordination of monetary policy, taking 
account of developments within the zone and its member countries. 
Since these changes the WAMU is formally headed by the Conference of the Head of States. This 
Conference decides on adrnission of candidate member countries. The Council of Ministers remained 
the most important policy formulating body and decides on the (global) monetary and credit policy 
for the zone. At the national level the monetary policy is implemented by the so called National 
Credit Committees. 
In the CAMA two institutions at ministerial level were established at higher level of authority than 
the central bank: the Monetary Committee and the Mixed Monetary Committee. The first one consists 
of the Ministers of Finance of the 6 participating African countries and conduct the monetary 
cooperation between the African countries. The second committee differs from the first in that the 
French Minister of Finance is also a member. lts main responsibility is to guide the monetary 
cooperation between the African countries and France. At national level the monetary policy is 
implemented by National Monetary Committees (NMC). 
The monetary arrangements 
At the formal establishment of the two monetary zones in the early 1960s, the African and French 
governments set up some rules to guide the functioning of the zone(s). 
1. The CFA franc was established at a fixed parity with the French 
franc equal to the parity of 1948 (1 FF = 50 CFAF). 
2. Convertibility was guaranteed by France through the so-called operations account (see next 
section), which both central banks kept - each separately - at the French Treasury.7 In exchange, 
France got representation in the policy formulating bodies. 
3. There is free movement of capital within the zone, including to and from France. 
4. The foreign reserves were kept on the operations account at the French Treasury in French francs. 
At the start of the monetary arrangement all foreign reserves had to be kept in French francs; 
nowadays the requirement is that at least 65% should be kept as French francs. 
The operations account 
Both zones employ a separate operations account on which payments and receipts to and from 
countries outside the zone are performed and registered. The financial transactions are registered for 
each individual country separately. Since the institutional changes in the early '70 at least 65% of the 
6
 Some authors use the term BEAC-zone instead of CAMA. 
7
 This guaranteed convertibility is not unrestricted but depends on the balance on the operation account (of the WAMU 
resp. CAMA). Convertibility is namely guaranteed as long as this balance is positive. 
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total reserves must be kept (in French francs) at the operations account, except for gold and SDRs.8 
There is no limit on the deficits of the central banks at the operations account. Any remaining deficit 
will be carried by the French Treasury (in casu granted credit). 
In the Statutes of the banks is established that the banks need to maintain an adequate amount of 
liquidity/foreign reserves on their operations account. In line with this and in relation to the monetary 
and credit policy some rules have been set up. 
If the balance of foreign reserves held at the operations account is less than 20% of direct claimable 
obligations for a period of 3 months on end, the African central banks have to take measures to limit 
supply of credit. The African countries are obliged to pay the following interest rates if their balance 
on the operations account is negative: 
- for the first tranche (a deficit of 0 - 5 million FF): 1 % 
- for the second tranche (a deficit between 5-10 million FF): 2% 
- for the last tranche (a deficit bigger than 10 million FF): the average interest on short term Treasury 
issues. 
In return the French Ministry of Finance pays interest equal to the average interest on short term 
Treasury issues if the operation account shows a surplus above 10 million FF. 
The instruments of monetary policy 
The monetary policy is aimed at control over the domestic credit provision so that an adequate 
balance of foreign reserves results. However, the supply of credit to the public as well as to the 
private sector is limited. There is not much differences in instruments between the two zones. In both 
zones the domestic capital markets are not well developed so that the commercial banks are dependent 
on the credit provision of their central banks. 
Rediscount ceilings are for both zones the most important instrument to influence the balance of 
foreign reserves held by the commercial banks. In the WAMU the central bank sets credit targets that 
are consistent with the balance of payments objective and with forecasts of the growth of nominal 
GDP for the individual countries. In practice, the Board of Directors relies on the targets for credit 
expansion proposed by the NMC's. The ceiling are principally based on macro-economie data and 
goals. 
In the CAMA, the monetary policy is determined by the central bank's Board of Directors assisted, 
at the national level, by the National Monetary Committees. In this zone ceilings are also set for each 
commercial bank and for each individual entrepreneur with accounts at the bank (depending on i.e. 
of this financial situation and his relevance for the economical development). In the CAMA the main 
emphasis lies on establishment of a sound financial position for the commercial banks. 
In both zones credit supply to the central government is also constrained. The ceiling is set at a 
maximum of 20% of the fiscal receipts of the previous year. This rule implies that the governments 
can not finance their deficits by increasing money supply without limits. 
A second instrument for monetary policy is the rediscount rate. In the WAMU these are uniform 
throughout the zone. In the CAMA these can vary between the participating countries, because the 
NMC's have a certain degree of freedom - within the limits imposed by the Board - to set these 
ceilings. 
8
 Because of the possibility that the French franc devalues -which would result in a loss for the African countries -
France guaranteed from then on the value of their French francs reserves in SDR's. 
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A third and fourth instrument are the minimum liquidity-ratio the central banks can impose to the 
commercial banks and the obligation to place fmancial assets in special deposits at the central banks. 
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Figure 1 
LA ZONE FRANC EN AFRIQUE 
' / / ' / . 
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COMORES 
Bron: Institut Technique de Banque, 1987 
Table 1.1 
Participating countries CFA franc zone 
Country Join (in) 
leave (out) 
Region Population 
(min) 
BBP (in mrd 
CFA franc* 
Benin UR WAMU 4,6 (1989) 516,9 (1990) 
Burkina Faso WAMU 2,9 (1990) 360,1 (1991) 
Central African 
Republic CAMA 2,7 (1987) 323,7 (1987) 
Comoros in 1981 
Djibouti out 1949 
Eguatorial 
Guinee in 1985 CAMA 0,3 (1990) 43,8 (1990) 
Gabon CAMA 1,1 (1989) 1 .284,5 (1990) 
Guinea out 1958 
Ivory Coast WAMU 11,2 (1990) 2 .705,0 (1990) 
Cameroun CAMA 11,6 (1990) 3 .207,0 (1990) 
Congo CAMA 2,3 (1990) 788,8 (1991) 
Madagascar out 1963 
Mali out 1962 
in 1984 WAMU 8,3 (1990) 677,4 (1990) 
Mauretania out 1973 
Niger WAMU 7,7 (1991) 644,8 (1991) 
Réunion out 1985 
Senegal WAMU 6,7 (1987) 1 .307,0 (1987) 
St. Pierre 
en MiqueIon out 1975 
Togo WAMU 3,5 (1990) 460,8 (1990) 
Chad CAMA 5,3 (1987) 213,6 (1987) 
* NB: If nothing is said about joinig or leaving the zones, 
those countries take part in the zone since L945 
50 CFA franc = 1 Frenen franc bef ore the devaluation 
Bron: IMF 1990, p 42 
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Section 2 The theory of the optimal currency area and the CFA franc zone 
Starting from the seminal article of Mundell (1961) on economie unions, economie literature has 
extensively studied the optimal conditions for economie unions. The optimal currency area 
literature normally uses a Western perspective, concentrating on developed economies with a 
relative large amount of intrazonal trade. The theory of optimal currency areas is in that case 
based on maximum use of the gains from trade. We will call this theory the traditional optimal 
currency area theory in this section. 
The development of a theory of optimal currency areas for developing countries is 
relatively neglected. Relatively little attention was paid to additional advantages currency areas 
especially with participation of developed countries could yield to developing countries. However, 
especially in relation with the CFA franc zone some literature has emerged in which additional 
advantages - relevant for developing countries - for participation in monetary unions are 
established. In this section, we elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of economie unions 
for both developed and developing countries, and evaluate die motives of CFA countries to 
participate in the CFA franc zone. As in the relevant literature, we find that traditional (e.g., the 
theory based on Western countries) currency area theory can not satisfactorily explain 
participation in the CFA franc zone, while the additional advantages mentioned in literature can 
better explain participation in the CFA franc zone. 
The advantages of currency areas according to traditional theory 
The economie literature is not unanimous about the advantages of economie currency areas. Two 
advantages are always mentioned:9 
Reduction of transaction costs'0 
An advantage of the formation of a currency area is the elimination of some types of transactions 
costs. Firstly, costs of exchanging currencies are avoided, because one currency is used for all 
intraregional trade. Though this is the main reduction of transaction costs, additional costs like 
transaction costs on forward or futures markets to hedge exchange rate risks and information costs 
are also avoided." 
It should be noted that the reduction of transaction costs is solely confined to transactions 
within the zone itself. The relative advantage of the reduction of transactions costs is therefore 
more important as intraregional trade becomes more significant relative to total trade. 
Elimination of exchange rate risk.12 
Exchange rate risk is the risk associated with future cash flows nominated in foreign currencies. 
Because of possible changes in the exchange rate, it is possible that future receipts in foreign 
currencies lose their value in the local currency. Introduction of one currency for the whole area 
eliminates the exchange rate risk for intraregional trade, because payments and receipts of 
intraregional trade will be nominated in the currency of the economie zone. The exchange rate 
9
 Bakker (1991) p.654. An other advantage often mentioned is the elimination of speculative capital flows, which may 
upset monetary policy. See Ishiyama (1975) p.362. In this context Boonstra remarked with respect to the speculative assault 
on the French franc that fmancial markets function not only as an equilibrating force, but may be a source of disturbances 
themselves. 
10
 Ishiyama (1975) p.362. 
11
 Naert (1981) p.44. 
12
 Ishiyama (1975) p.362. For the various types of exchange rate risk see appendix 2. 
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risk of interregional trade will remain unaffected by the introduction of the currency area. 
The disadvantages of currency areas according to traditional theory 
The following disadvantages of introduction of currency areas are often mentioned:B 
Loss of exchange rate modifications as a policy instrument 
Within the zone, it is not possible to alter the nominal exchange rate, so that disequilibria on the 
balance of payments may persist. It should be noted that the real exchange rate, which is also 
affected by changes in wages and prices, and changes in labour and capital productivity, may 
change. Wage and price flexibility and/or high factor mobility may therefore compensate for the 
loss of the exchange rate instrument. 
Inflation and unemployment trade-off determination 
After introduction of the currency area, the monetary policy is centralised, so that independent 
national monetary policy becomes impossible. Therefore, the tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment will become an exogenous variable. Assuming a negative relation between inflation 
and unemployment, and given the necessity of equal changes in prices and wages, high inflation 
countries will have to change their policy, causing lower inflation and higher unemployment. This 
disadvantage is less important the more equal the inflation in the member countries.14 
Furthermore, it is important that some agreement exists on the relative importance of the goals of 
inflation reduction and unemployment reduction, as the policy in any member country may spill 
over into the other member countries. 
Regional dijferences 
Monetary integration not only requires harmonisation of the rates of inflation of the member 
countries, but also requires harmonisation of real cost increases. An increase in wages relative to 
labour productivity in some of the member countries will cause unemployment in these countries 
to rise, and will cause factor movements to countries with higher productivity growth. Monetary 
integration will therefore tend to increase regional disequilibria. 
For an important part, real economie changes are caused by external factors, like export demand 
and oil price fluctuations. Therefore, regional differences will not be an important factor if the 
member countries of an economie union are simultaneously and equally affected by external 
changes, which is normally only the case if these countries have comparable export and import 
'baskets'. Furthermore, external disturbances will be of less importance if intraregional trade is 
more important relative to interregional trade. 
Conclusion 
From the above, we can conclude that the advantages of a monetary union are large when 
intraregional trade is relatively large, while the disadvantages are small when wage and price 
elasticity are high, differences in productivity changes are high, factor mobility is high, inflation 
rates are comparable, and export and import structures are equal. 
13
 See, among others, De Grauwe et al (1976) pp.95-97. 
14
 This disadvantage disappears if one assumes no permanent trade-off of unemployment for inflation. See De Grauwe 
et al (1976) p.95. 
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The criteria for an optimal currency area, according to the traditional theory. 
Criteria for an optimal currency area can be found by maximization of the advantages, and 
minimization of the disadvantages of a currency area. Several factors compensate partly for the 
loss of the exchange rate instrument (see 1-4 below). Furthermore, the increase of gains from 
elimination of exchange rate risk and reduction of transaction costs, as well as reducing the 
influence of external disturbances is large when intraregional trade is important (see 5 below). 
1) Wage and price flexibility; 
2) Factormobility; 
3) Similar export and import structures within the zone; 
4) Equal inflation rates; 
5) Relatively much intraregional trade. 
Do the CFA countries satisfy the optimality criteria? 
Wage flexibility 
It is not easy to analyze wage flexibility, due to the poor availability of wage data. However, 
some circumstantial evidence can be provided. The minimum wage in most of the CFA countries 
was frozen.16 As the wage structure in relative terms is often constant, wage flexibility was 
probably low and rigid downward in nominal terms. 
Price flexibility 
To analyze the price flexibility with respect to external changes producer prices were analyzed.17 
Most of the CFA countries try to stabilise their export revenues by introducing producer prices18 
to guarantee a minimum income for the producers. These prices are set by so called stabilisation 
funds or marketing boards. These marketing boards buy the products and sell these subsequently 
on the world markets. A survey of producer and world market prices in the eighties is given in 
table 2.1. The producer prices are shown to be rigid downward, so that the competitivity of 
exports has declined. 
Concluding, the little evidence available suggests that both wages and prices were quite rigid 
downward in the CFA countries. 
Factor mobility 
Under this heading we analyze the labour and capital mobility within the CFA franc zone. It 
should be noted beforehand that it is not possible to ascertain whether these factor movements 
reflect underlying differences in scarcities, which is a necessary optimality condition. 
Labour mobility 
The CFA countries occupy an area approximately 14 times the size of France, while its population 
is only one third of that of France. Hence, population density is low. Labour mobility is therefore 
not only affected by differences in wages, but also by large distances between population centers, 
combined with poor transport and communication facilities. 
15
 See, among others, Mundell (1961) and Fleming (1971). 
16
 IMF (1990) p.28. 
17
 We concentrate on prices of export products because decline of competitiveness is here of most importance. 
18
 Minimum prices to producers of primary commodities. 
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According to Condé en Zachariah there exist a long tradition of international labour 
migration in West Africa. From 1960 onwards, the Ivory Coast has been the country to which the 
migration flows (especially from Burkina Faso and Mali) are directed. Senegal also attracts a large 
number of labourers from Burkina Faso, Mali and Gambia. Surprisingly, the authors found that 
economie factors are significant causal factors of the migration flows.19 
Condé and Zachariah's conclusions are corroborated by a more recent World Bank study, 
which also found that migration in West Africa is large, and that the main flows are directed from 
Burkina Faso and Mali to the Ivory Coast.20 
Capital mobility 
In the CFA franc zone exists complete capital mobility. One should expect capital flows to be 
directed to those countries in which the return on investment (ROI) is highest. Whether this is true 
in reality is difficult to ascertain: According to a study by Honohan it is not clear whether capital 
flows reflect underlying scarcity differences.21 Loans are to a large extent determined by policy 
considerations, rather than based on economical considerations: 
"A permanent pattern of persistent borrowers and patiënt lenders might be justified on the 
basis of a higher marginal product of capital in the borrowing countries, in which case the 
lending countries might achieve a better return than if they had increased domestic 
expenditure. However the fact that much of the credit has gone to banks which have 
failed, proves that credit has not sought out high-yielding activities."22 
Summarizing: The CFA countries are characterized by large labour mobility, which reflects 
differences in (labour) productivity. Capital mobility, however, is seemingly not related to 
differences in scarcity. 
Similar export and import structures within the zone. 
Whether the member countries of a currency area are similarly affected by extemal disturbances is 
to a large part determined by the (absence of) comparability of export and import structures. 
Concentrating on the differences in export structures we find that the two zones differ strongly in 
export structure (see table 2.2). In the WAMU countries, with the exception of uranium exporting 
Niger, the major export products agricultural commodities (especially coffee and cocoa). In the 
CAMA countries, the most important export products are minerals. 
Summarizing, the export structure of the CFA countries roughly follows the two zones within the 
CFA zone, with little intra-subzone differences, but large differences between the subzones. 
Equal rates of inflation 
In the special case of the CFA franc zone, the rates of inflation among the CFA countries should 
be approximately equal. There are no rules within the CFA franc zone which guarantee equal 
inflation rates, so that inflation rates could diverge. However, the inflation rates of the CFA 
countries do not diverge too much (see figure 2.1), and are comparable with that of France. 
Intraregional trade 
19
 Condé en Zachariah (1981) p.10. 
20
 Russell and Teitelbaum (1992) p.20. 
21
 Honohan (1990) p.5. 
22
 Honohan (1990) pp.11-12. 
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From table 2.3 it appears that the intraregional trade of the CFA countries is quite low, while the 
(interregional) trade with France and Europe is relatively high. 
Conclusion 
Based on traditional theory, it is difficult to explain the existence of the CFA franc zone. The 
member countries of the CFA franc zone do not satisfy most of the above mentioned optimality 
criteria, so that the advantages are relatively low, while the disadvantages are relatively high. We 
can conclude that it is not possible to explain the existence of the CFA franc zone satisfactorily on 
base of traditional theory. In the next section, we will investigate some additional factors which 
can explain the existence of the CFA franc zone. 
Additional considerations for participation in the CFA franc zone. 
A large number of African countries has pegged its currency to some Western currency. 
Devarajan and De Melo state that: 
"Developing countries do not face the same choices as developed countries (...): whereas 
developed countries face a range of alternatives from independent floating to a fixed 
exchange rate, a developing country's choice is simply 'what to peg to ?' The alternative 
of independent floating is not open to developing countries because of thin foreign 
exchange markets, restrictions on capital flows and limited capital markets."23 
So the pegging of a national currency to some Western currency is quite normal; ho wever, the 
CFA franc zone is special in that its members peg collectively to the French franc, while France 
itself is an active member of the system. 
As we found out in the preceding sections, traditional theory of economie unions can not 
explain the existence of CFA franc zone. Here, we investigate some additional considerations 
which may explain why the CFA franc zone exists. To cite Boughton: 
"In addition to benefits that might accrue from belonging to a currency union, the CFA 
franc countries may derive benefits from adhering to a monetary Standard vis a vis the 
French franc: in effect becoming part of a broad European monetary zone."24 
The advantages which accrue to the CFA countries are not so much associated with the economie 
union itself, as associated with the institutions which are necessary for the functioning of the CFA 
franc zone. 
First, we consider the effects of pegging to the French franc, which affects the advantages 
to be obtained from traditional theory. Thereafter, we investigate additional advantages like 
discipline, credibility, competitivity and, in later sections, the evaluation of credit risk to CFA 
franc zone countries. 
Ï.The advantages are larger according to traditional theory, because of the collective peg to the 
French franc, which increases the regional spread of the "zone". 
According to traditional theory, the advantages of an economie union are larger the larger the 
relative importance of intraregional trade. However, because of the peg to the French franc and, 
indirectly, the "peg" to the other countries of the EC, both transaction costs and exchange rate 
risk with France and the other EC countries are to a large extent reduced. Within the context of 
Devarajan and De Melo (1987) p.484. 
Boughton (1991) p.17. 
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the traditional theory of optimal currency areas, France and the other EC countries might be 
properly viewed as part of the currency area; therefore intraregional trade is much larger than 
appears at first. 
Another effect of the CFA franc zone is the stimulation of regional investments. Due to 
elimination of (a large part of) exchange rate risk for investors from the EC and the necessity of 
comparable inflation rates in France and the CFA franc zone, investments in the CFA franc zone 
are relatively safe. This may reduce the interest rate, because of a lower risk premium, and 
therefore could stimulate investments and economie activity. 
2. Advantages related to the operations account. 
Because of the pooling of the foreign currencies on each of the two operations accounts it is 
possible for countries with a positive balance of payments to compensate those countries with a 
negative balance of payments. Furthermore, because of the existence of the operations account, no 
CFA country will ever lack foreign exchange, as long as the balance on the operations account 
(summing the balances of each country) is positive, because under these conditions, convertibility 
is guaranteed. Devarajan and de Melo point out that this is especially important for developing 
countries, who are often forced in a what they call stop-go policy (restricting resp. stimulating 
demand) depending on availability of foreign exchange. 
3 Discipline 
As the inflation rates of France and the CFA franc zone countries should not diverge too much, it 
is clear that introduction of the CFA franc zone causes some monetary discipline. Furthermore, a 
clear penalty exists on violation of this discipline, so that an announced low inflation policy is 
more credible then without the CFA franc zone membership (see also the next section). From 
table 2.4, it appears that the CFA member countries are characterised by relatively low inflation 
rates, compared with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 
4. Credibility 
The effectiveness of a policy aimed at reduction of price instability is largely dependent on the 
credibility of the policy. The same holds for a fixed exchange rate policy: 
"An obvious way to make the fixed exchange rate regime credible would be for the 
authorities to surrender the power to alter the exchange rate. This could be achieved, for 
example, by forming a currency union under which a group of countries adopts a common 
currency - the CFA franc zone provides an example of such an arrangement."25 
The CFA franc zone increases the credibility of the policies announced by its member countries 
by reducing the autonomy of its member countries, while at the same time increasing the penalty 
on non-compliance. Furthermore, membership of the CFA franc zone enhances the possibilities to 
follow a fixed exchange rate policy by decreasing the problem of shortages of foreign currencies. 
From table 2.5 it appears that the economie growth in the CFA franc zone in the period 1973-
1989 is higher than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. However, in table 2.4 we find that growth 
rate in the CFA countries declined substantially in the later part of the eighties, so that growth in 
the CFA franc zone was then lower than in the rest of Africa. 
We find a similar pattern for the exports of the zone and for investments in the zone. It therefore 
appears that the role which increased credibility might have had in causing growth of some macro 
aggregates has ended in the second half of the eighties. 
Aghevlietal (1991) p.16. 
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5. Competitivity 
Changes in the real exchange rate is a good proxy for the changes in the international 
competitiveness of some country.26 The real exchange rate in an economie union can change 
because of differences in inflation rates. Because of relatively low inflation rates within the CFA 
franc zone, there is no tendency of systematic overvaluation of the CFA franc zone, so that the 
international competitiveness of the CFA franc zone is relatively good. 
"as domestic prices [in non CFA countries, MR and CT] rosé considerably faster than developed 
country trading partners' prices and exchange rates remained pegged to the US-dollar, SDR (...). 
In the franc zone there was lower inflation and, to a lesser extent, nomina! devaluation of the 
French franc peg against other international currencies: i.e. franc zone members were pegged to a 
weaker currency than NFZ [non CFA countries]."27 
This pattern was reversed in the later part of the eighties, however. 
"The recent depreciation [of the REER's of non-franc zone countries, MR and CT] has 
returned exchange rates to a relatively competitive level vis-a-vis franc zone countries. We 
(...) show that the foreign exchange equivalent of costs in NFZ are now likely to be 
substantially lower than in the franc zone."28 
2.4.6 Country risk assessment 
A possible additional motive for participation in the CFA franc zone is a more positive assessment 
in a country risk analysis. This will create a more easy access to international financial markets. 
The postulated higher creditworthiness is the result of a number of factors, like low inflation, 
guaranteed convertibility, etc. and will be investigated in section 4, after a brief introduction into 
country risk assessment in general in section 3. 
Conclusion 
Traditional theories of economie unions are not able to explain the existence of the CFA franc 
zone. Many additional factors can explain why the CFA franc zone could be attractive to its 
member countries, among which the peg with the French franc, which increases the advantages 
mentioned in the traditional theory, and a number of additional factors, like increased credibility 
of government policy, monetary discipline, guaranteed convertibility, etc. In this section, we have 
hypothesized the possibility of additional gains resulting from higher creditworthiness in a country 
risk assessment study. This will be the subject of the following two sections. 
26
 "A (...) indicator of a country's international competitiveness is the real effective exchange rate which takes account 
of relative movements in domestic and international prices. A rise in the real effective index generally implies an 
appreciation (loss of competitiveness) and a fall, a depreciation (gain in competitiveness), although (...) depending upon 
how they have been calculated." Rawinks, 1989, p.43. 
27
 Lane and Page (1991) p.7. 
28
 Lane and Page (1991) p.8. 
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Table 2. 1 
Selected agricultural produceir prices, 1980 -89 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Coffee * 141 127 166 215 274 247 233 140 128 110 
Ivory Coast 
Cameroon 
CAR 
Togo 
300 
310 
na 
200 
300 
320 
330 
200 
300 
330 
337 
215 
300 
350 
347 
235 
350 
390 
367 
290 
380 
430 
397 
315 
400 
440 
418 
365 
400 
440 
483 
400 
400 
440 
483 
400 
400 
440 
na 
350 
Cocoa beans 113 116 118 166 215 208 147 124 97 81 
Ivory Coast 
Cameroon 
Togo 
300 
290 
220 
300 
300 
220 
300 
310 
225 
300 
330 
235 
350 
370 
275 
375 
410 
300 
400 
420 
330 
400 
420 
360 
400 
420 
360 
400 
420 
300 
Cotton 90 103 108 145 160 122 75 102 86 110 
Burkina F. 
Chad 
Niger 
Senegal 
55 
50 
62 
55 
55 
50 
62 
60 
62 
60 
80 
68 
62 
70 
120 
70 
70 
80 
120 
70 
90 
100 
120 
70 
100 
100 
130 
100 
100 
100 
130 
100 
95 
100 
110 
100 
95 
100 
100 
100 
Peanuts 181 283 192 271 444 407 197 150 176 248 
Benin 
Burkina F. 
Ivory Coast 
Niger 
Senegal 
40 
54 
50 
75 
46 
50 
81 
50 
75 
50 
60 
131 
50 
85 
70 
65 
131 
50 
90 
70 
80 
131 
50 
90 
70 
80 
131 
50 
100 
80 
95 
150 
50 
130 
90 
85 
90 
50 
130 
90 
95 
90 
50 
95 
90 
50 
95 
na 
na 
70 
Corn 27 36 36 52 59 50 30 23 32 36 
Burkina F. 
Ivory Coast 
Congo 
40 
30 
43 
45 
30 
47 
50 
30 
59 
60 
40 
65 
60 
40 
68 
85 
40 
73 
80 
40 
73 
40 
50 
85 
50 
45 
na 
45 
na 
na 
* Robusta cc 
Source: IMF 
f fee 
1990 
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Tabl< 3 2.2a 
Structure of the export in the 
(in percentages, 1983-1985 
WAMU 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Ivory 
Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo Tot. 
Vegetable oils 8 19 2 3 1 30 2 6 
Palm oil 
Peanuts and oil 
Oil. seeds and fruit 
Oilcake 
6 
2 
17 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
24 
6 
2 2 
3 
1 
Beverages 22 54 20 38 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
7 
15 
24 
30 
7 
13 
17 
21 
Other Food 1 3 4 4 6 31 8 
Living animals 
Fish 
Bananas 
Sugar 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
4 6 
31 
1 
6 
1 
1 
Agricultural products 17 49 16 65 1 4 9 15 
Wood 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
17 41 
8 
12 
3 
1 
62 
3 1 
3 
1 
9 
8 
6 
1 
Furs and skins 7 3 1 1 
Rubber 1 1 1 
Minerals 40 9 80 14 45 16 
Uranium 
Petroleum 
Aluminium 
Calcium phosphates 
Magnesium 
40 9 
80 
14 
2 
43 
5 
7 
4 
Total 
Other exports 
Total 
88 
12 
100 
71 
29 
100 
85 72 
15 28 
100 100 
88 
12 
100 
79 
21 
100 
76 
24 
100 
83 
17 
100 
IMF 1990 
16 
Table 2. 2 b 
Structure of exports in the 
(in percentages, 1933-1985) 
CAMZ 
Cameroon CAR Chad Congo Gabon 
Eguat. 
Guinea Tot. 
Vegetable oils 1 
Palm oil 
Peanuts and oil 
Oil containing seeds 
Oil cake 
1 
Beverages 24 31 59 9 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
11 
13 
31 5 
54 
4 
5 
Other Food 1 51 1 3 3 
Living animals 
Fish 
Bananas 
Sugar 
1 
51 
1 
1 
2 
3 
Agricultural materials 13 23 49 2 7 33 10 
Wood 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
Furs and Skins 
Rubber 
6 
5 
1 
1 
8 
11 
3 
1 
2 
49 
7 32 5 
5 
Minerals 46 91 92 70 
Uranium 
Petroleum 
Aluminium 
Calcium phosphates 
Magnesium 
43 
3 
91 
3 
83 
6 
1 
65 
1 
2 
Total 
Other exports 
Total 
85 
15 
100 
54 
46 
100 
100 94 
0 6 
100 100 
99 
1 
100 
95 
5 
100 
92 
8 
100 
Source: IMF 1990 
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Table 2.3 
Intra regional trade 
(percentages, 1982-1985) 
% of % of % of % of tot. % of tot. 
total total total trade to trade to 
exports imports trade France rest Europe 
CFA franc zone 6,6 10,7 8,6 
WAMU 11,6 15,4 13,7 26,9 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Ivory Coast 
Mali 
Niger 
Senegal 
Togo 
4,7 25,5 21,2 20,2 38,8 
17,9 56,5 49,8 32,9 20,3 
11,5 7,8 9,9 22,7 37,6 
25,3 37,8 34,6 25,6 29,9 
3,0 13,7 9,0 55,2 16,6 
13,7 6,4 9,0 32,5 23,7 
12,0 10,3 10,9 24,6 37,2 
CAMZ 1,7 3,2 2,3 34,4 
CAR 
Eq. Guinea 
Gabon 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Chad 
0,6 8,4 4,8 44,9 24,2 
0,6 2,6 1,6 1,7 79,4 
0,4 1,5 0,7 40,3 22,1 
5,2 2,4 3,6 33,3 40,5 
0,2 2,2 1,0 26,5 29,5 
6,9 28,5 19,6 32,6 42,1 
Source: IMF, 1990, p. 16. 
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Table 2.4 
Movements of economie indicators in the eighties 
1982 - 85 1986 - 89 
Average growth real GDP (in %) 
CFA (11) 
others 
SSA (20) 
Low income (41) 
Primary (52) 
3,5 
1,0 
2,4 
4,8 
1,8 
3,0 
3,4 
2,9 
Total investments/real GDP 
CFA 
others 
SSA 
Low income 
Primary 
21,3 
18,4 
20,7 
20,6 
16,6 
17,1 
18,8 
18,2 
Average yearly inflation 
CFA 
others 
SSA 
Low income 
Primary 
8,6 
26, 2 
19,5 
28,9 
1,0 
35,7 
50,4 
64,4 
Average yearly growth of exports 
CFA 
others 
SSA 
Low income 
Primary 
3,0 
0,1 
1,2 
7,6 
0,1 
5,0 
8,8 
7,7 
Source: Devaraj an and De Melo, 1990 , p. 10. 
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Tabl e 2.5 
Movements of economie indicators , 1973 - 1989 
(Wei ghted with GDP) 
Average Average % Increase (+)/ 
1973 - 1981 1982 - 1989 Decrease (-) 
Average yearly inflation in %) 
CFA (11) 11,6 4,1 -7,5 
WAMU (7) 11,1 3,8 -7,3 
CAMZ (4) 11,7 5,7 -6,0 
others 
SSA (18) 14,0 17,3 3,3 
LIDC (25) 13,5 12,3 -1,2 
Average yearly growth of ' GDP (in %) 
CFA (11) 5,7 1,6 -4,1 
WAMU (7) 4,0 1,4 -2,6 
CAMZ (4) 8,2 2,0 -6,2 
others 
SSA (18) 2,8 1,3 -1,5 
LIDC (25) 5,5 6,2 0,7 
Average yearly growth of real exports (in %) 
CFA 7,0 -0,4 -7,4 
WAMU 5,1 0,0 -5,1 
CAMZ 9,9 -1,0 -10,9 
others 
SSA 1,2 2,5 1,3 
LIDC 7,6 8,9 1,3 
Rat io investments to GDP (constant prizes) 
CFA 28,5 21,4 -7,1 
WAMU 25,5 16,3 -9,0 
CAMZ 33,0 29,1 -3,9 
others 
SSA 28,0 15,7 -12,3 
LIDC 25,7 27,1 1,4 
Rat io Savings to GDP (constant prizes) 
CFA 23,0 20,5 -2,5 
WAMU 16,5 11,6 -4,9 
CAMZ 32,9 34,1 1,2 
others 
SSA 20,9 11,7 -9,2 
LIDC 17,9 15,2 -2,7 
Source: Elbadawi and Maj d, 1992 , p. 13. 
Section 3 Country risk and country risk analyses 
One of the possible additional advantages of participation in the CFA franc zone is a positive 
influence on country risk and/or country risk analysis.29 The influence of participation in a 
monetary union on country risk analysis is neglected in literature. In this section we describe the 
country risk analysis itself. In the next section we deal in more detail with the specific influence of 
CFA franc zone membership on country risk. 
What is country risk? 
Lending across borders adds an extra element to credit risk analysis. Apart from commercial risk 
(which needs to be assessed in any case) one should now also consider country risk. When lending 
to an foreign borrower (i.e. a bank or an enterprise) it is not only important to check the 
creditworthiness30 of the debtor itself (commercial risk), but also the creditworthiness of the 
country of the borrower (country risk31). Even if the borrower is able to service its debt, it needs 
to be able to obtain foreign exchange and (in some cases) permission of the government in order 
to do so. This last aspect, the risk that either foreign exchange or government permission to use 
foreign exchange is not obtainable, is referred to as country risk. When analyzing the country risk 
one has to analyze the economie capability as well as the political willingness to (re)pay the debt. 
Country risk is composed of political and transfer risk. 
Political risk is the risk that due to political situations (war, revolution etc.) in which a 
country is involved may influence the ability to repay debt. Transfer risk is the risk that economie 
circumstances may force a country to impose restrictions on remittances of capital, dividends etc. 
to foreign lenders/and or investors. 
"Transfer risk is structured around the relation between a country's cross-border liabilities 
as well as its need to incur new debt, and its ability or inability to earn or obtain the 
necessary foreign exchange to service those liabilities as well as to get new credits."32 
Both risks can influence and reinforce each other. 
"This is especially the case if one of the two risks is worsening. The other risk is then 
frequently drawn along. An example is the situation where the economy of a country has 
suffered substantially due to changes - e.g. in international commodity prices such as 
copper - which then leads to enhanced political instability due to economie difficulties. 
This instability obviously brings with it a worsening of political risk. Transfer risk can 
also be very much influenced by political decisions. "33 
29
 Indeed, it is useful to distinguish between country risk analysis and country risk itself, as country risk analysis of 
some type of countries might be systematically biassed. For example, with underestimation of country risk in the country 
risk analysis for CFA members, CFA members would be able to obtain larger foreign loans with better conditions than 
comparable non-members. 
30
 Creditworthiness can be defined as the ability to repay the credit at the corresponding conditions. 
31
 A definition of country risk is "the possibility that a sovereign state of sovereign borrowers of a particular country 
may be unable or unwilling, and other borrowers unable, to fulfil their obligations towards a foreign lender and/or investor 
for reasons beyond the usual risks which arise in relation to all lending and investments". Krayenbuehl, 1987, p 3. 
32
 Krayenbuehl, 1985, p. 37. 
33
 Krayenbuehl, 1985, p 23. 
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Elements in country risk assessment 
In assessing a country's ability to service debt many different elements need to be considered, 
such as economie growth, the current account deficit, interna! tensions etc. Commonly, those 
elements are combined in three different groups of indicators: political indicators, the internal 
economie indicators and extemal economie indicators. The internal economie and external 
economie indicators are relevant to assess transfer risk, the political indicators are of course 
relevant to political risk. The risk indicators which are normally used by commercial banks in 
assessing country risk are presented in table 3.1. 
Internal economie indicators 
The creditworthiness of a country depends in a major way on the internal economie situation. The 
following risk indicators are relevant for assessing a country's ability to generate a surplus income 
above the necessary minimum, which possibly (i.a., depending on the ability to exchange local 
currency for future currency) could be used to repay debt. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
The GDP per capita roughly gives a general impression of a country's wealth. The higher the 
wealth of a country, the larger its ability to service debt. If the GDP per capita is low one can 
assume it will be more difficult to cut in the (already low) consumption in order to repay foreign 
debts, so that (all other factors constant) the ability to service debt will be lower when GDP per 
capita is low. 
Economie growth per capita 
To increase it's wealth a country has to realise an economie growth which is higher than 
population growth. High growth per capita figures therefore indicate that a country's ability to 
service debt will increase in the future; therefore, high growth of GDP/capita is regarded 
favourably in country risk analysis. 
Degree of investment 
The degree of investment is the ratio of gross investments to GDP. It can be used as an indicator 
of economie growth in the near future, with higher degree of investment indicating higher future 
growth. But note that the productivity of the investments should also ideally be considered, 
because improductive investment will lower growth. What may help is to use the incremental 
capital output ratio (ICOR), but this indicator is not perfect either.34 
Inflation 
The rate of inflation, its recent changes and its trend are indicators for economie stability. In 
general, high rates of inflation, and uncertain fluctuations in the rate of inflation increase the risk 
and uncertainties of investments and therefore cause declines in investment.35 Furthermore, if the 
rate of inflation is relatively high (with respect to other countries) and not compensated by a 
devaluation the currency will become overvalued. As a consequence of this, exports may decrease 
and imports might grow resulting in a deterioration of the current account. 
Summarizing, high rates of inflation (and especially, if accompanied by large fluctuations in rates 
34
 As an example of the caution one should exercise with interpreting the ICOR, investment in infrastructure may 
contribute in an important way to growth, while a first glance at its low ICOR would suggest otherwise. Bird, 1989, p 40. 
35
 "Relative price variability increases with inflation which implies that producers will be more prone to making errors 
in their input and output decisions because of their inability to predict changing relative prices." A second explanation is 
thai "monetary variability adds noise to the ex-ante real returns and hence may lead to a decline in marginal propensity to 
invest". Devarajan and De Melo, 1987, p 495. 
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of inflation) will lower growth, and therefore, limit capacity to service debt, and therefore 
increase country risk; furthermore, the ability to earn foreign exchange to service debt will decline 
with high rates of inflation. 
Fiscal deficit 
The relationship between the fiscal deficit and country risk is elaborated on by (i.a.) Rawkins: 
"The size of the fiscal deficit can have significant impact on the balance of payments. 
(...): a deterioration in the first often leads to a crisis in the second. An expansionary 
fiscal stance drives up expenditure relative to output, invariably causing consumption to 
spill over into imports, thus narrowing the trade surplus or increasing the deficit. The 
additional saving required may lead the government to borrow abroad to finance the 
deficit. This imposes an additional burden on the current account through higher interest 
payments. Alternatively, domestic sources of financing may have inflationary 
consequences that give rise to an overvalued exchange rate, growing uncertainty and 
private capital flight abroad. "36 
External economie indicators 
The risk-indicators for the external economie sector yield an assessment of the inflow of foreign 
exchange, both in the short and long term, in relation to the time related need for foreign 
exchange to pay off debts. The following indicators are commonly used for analysis and 
monitoring of the external economie factors influencing transfer risk. 
Diversification of exports 
Both geographical diversification of export markets and product diversification of the exports is 
important. A country that heavily depends on the exports of just a few products or on exports to 
few countries will more severely be affected by fluctuations of international prices or downturns in 
their export countries than countries with more diversified exports, both in terms of products and 
product markets. As a result the country risk will be higher with exports concentrated in a few 
products and export markets. 
Export ratio 
A higher ratio of exports to GDP implies that a large part of production factors are allocated to 
the international sector rather than to the protected domestic sector. The former is often more 
productive and competitive. In addition, a high export ratio strengthens the capacity to pay off 
debts as the export sector generates foreign exchange. On the other hand a high export ratio can 
imply a high dependence on international developments. 
Ratio of total foreign debt to exports 
This ratio is an essential indicator for the long term ability to pay off debt, as the foreign debt 
must eventually be paid off by foreign exchange receipts from exports. The higher this ratio the 
higher the country risk. 
Debt service ratio 
The debt service ratio is the proportion of annual interest payments of foreign debts to export 
36
 Rawkins, 1989, p 39. Later on, he explains that "monetizing the fiscal deficit is one of the most common causes of 
inflation in developing countries and invariably leads to balance-of-payments difficulties. Initiaily the supply of money 
exceeds demand, driving up prices. If exchange rate fails to adjust, the currency becomes overvalued, stimulating imports 
and depressing exports. Confidence starts to erode and capital flight ensues." 
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income. The lower the ratio, the lower the country risk.37 Rather than the ratio of total foreign 
debt to exports, this ratio focuses on the short term, and is indicative for liquidity problems. 
"An increase in the debt service ratio indicates increased vulnerability to foreign exchange 
crises. Any shortfall in foreign exchange earnings or capital imports which is not covered 
by exchange reserves must be met by reducing imports: since debt service is a fixed 
obligation, the higher the debt service ratio, the greater is the relative burden on import 
reduction for a given shortfall in foreign exchange."38 
This indicator has some disadvantages: 
"The debt service ratio is merely an indicator of the proportion of foreign exchange 
earnings which are free to purchase imports. If foreign exchange earnings are high relative 
to import demand, a high debt service ratio can be maintained. Furthermore, a country 
with a good credit standing in international money markets may be able to finance a 
higher debt service ratio, for a time at last, through a high level of borrowing."39 
Arrears on interest pavments 
This indicator yields an impression of willingness and capacity to service debt combined. Most 
countries with financial problems continue to service debt as long as possible. Therefore, a 
country with arrears in interest payments should not be considered a reliable debtor. 
Proportion of short term debts to total debts 
The higher ratio of the short term debt (less than 1 year) to total debt, the higher the country risk. 
Ceteris paribus a high ratio implies that the country is more sensitive for assessments of its 
country risks by the international financial conununity. The short term loans can easily be pulled 
back, so an acute liquidity crisis may occur. 
Import coverage 
Import coverage indicates how long the foreign exchange reserves will suffice to pay imports in 
total absence of any export receipts. A low import coverage indicates high vulnerability to 
reductions in export earnings and therefore the lower the import coverage the higher the country 
risk. 
Short term debt in relation to the foreign exchange reserves 
This indicator shows the ability of a country to pay its foreign debt (due within one month) out of 
foreign exchange reserves in case the country would not be able to borrow on the international 
financial market 
Financial means in relation to the quota by the IMF 
This indicator shows the amount on financial means the county has already used in relation to it 
IMF-quota. A high ratio indicates high country risk, because there is not much room for 
additional financing from official sources. 
37
 Krayenbuehl writes that a ratio of (lower than) 10% should be considered very good, while ratios reaching values 
of 25% or more indicate severe difficulties in servicing debt. Krayenbuehl, 1985, p 53. 
38
 Frank and Cline, 1971, p 329. 
35
 Frank en Cline, 1971, p 330. 
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Market discount on traded debt 
In case public debt is traded, any discount on the nominal value of the debt indicates the 
probability the debt will be repaid. A high discount implies that the market consensus is that the 
country risk is high. Some caution has to be exercised in interpreting market discounts, because 
the market is, with exception of Latin American debt, illiquid so that a small number of relatively 
small transactions can influence the perceived market discount in a major way. 
Political indicators 
It is very difficult to use ratios to establish political risk. The analysis is more qualitatively than 
quantitatively oriented. It aims to establish the influence of foreign or domestic politics on the 
liquidity and solvability of the country. The debt service capacity may for example change when 
there is a change of government (by force or regular). The following elements are commonly used 
in the political analysis. 
Evaluation of domestic policv 
Under this heading, the fïnancial and economie policies of the government are evaluated, as well 
as its ability to effectively implement its policies. Continuity in the policies is also a major factor, 
as a country with f.e. a highly variable legislative framework will be unattractive to invest in. 
However, the government must be able to react quickly when needed; as minority coalitions or 
otherwise weak governments often show some inertia, these are generally viewed disfavourably. 
Risk of interna! conflicts 
The risk of intemal conflicts is assessed on basis of the kind of government (dictator/no dictator), 
the composition of the population, regional or ethnic contrasts, religious tensions, armed 
opponents of the government or civil war. 
The chance of foreign conflicts 
Here the risks of military conflicts affecting the country are assessed. 
The weights of risk indicators in a country risk analysis 
Normally, an overall score for country risk is obtained by a weighted summation of the scores on 
the indicators mentioned above. However, as country risk analysis is a commercial activity, it is 
very difficult to find literature on the weights of various indicators used in country risk analysis. 
Apart from the fact that commercial interest cause some secrecy about the weights used, the 
objectively correct weights are difficult to assess. Nevertheless we will give some impression of 
the weights used in practice. 
Transfer risk can be separated into liquidity risk (in casu short term capacity to repay debts) and 
solvability risk (in casu the long term capacity to repay debts). Depending on the conditions of the 
loan either may be the major determinant of transfer risk. Robinson, as economist working for 
Chase Manhattan Bank, and Thompson give weighting factors for the liquidity risk analysis.40 
Thompson also provides a model for the solvability analysis.41 Both authors use a index from 0 
to 100, which is obtained by a weighted summation of scores on individual indicators. 
The liquidity analysis 
The liquidity analysis concentrates on the short term capacity to repay debt, and therefore 
40
 Robinson, 1981, p 74 respectively Thompson (on cit in Krayenbuehl), 1985, p 65. 
41
 Thompson on cit. in Krayenbuehl, 1985, p 68. 
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concentrates on the possibility to create a sufficiënt surplus of national income over necessary 
expenditures, and the possibility to obtain foreign exchange to transfer this surplus. As a result, 
long term growth and indicators for changes in long term growth like degree of investment, 
savings rates etc. are less relevant for the liquidity analysis, which mostly concentrates on a going 
concern analysis of the ability to repay debts based on foreign exchange earning from exports, the 
probability of large departures from "normal" going concern (diversification), and the ability to 
withstand such large departures from normal going concern (import coverage). Thompson's 
analysis uses the indicators and weights of table 3.1 
According to Krayenbuehl, an important indicator is absent in Thompson's analysis. Krayenbuehl 
advocates the use of the so-called 'liquidity gap ratio'. 
"It consists of the one-year-short-term debt minus the balance on the current account. Such 
a calculation gives a gap in liquidity if the total figure is positive. (...). Under normal 
market conditions one can assume that a liquidity gap ratio of 20 percent can be covered 
through additional short-term borrowing. The reasoning behind this ratio is that, bearing 
in mind changing market conditions, it will always be possible to fund a liquidity gap of a 
certain size as a measure to overcome short-term liquidity problems. The higher the 
percentage of the liquidity gap ratio, however, the more difficult it will be for the country 
concerned to manage successfully its short-term financial requirements."42 
The solvability analysis 
Thompson uses 9 indicators for assessing the solvability of a country. The main weight (45%) is 
attached to those indicators which measure the possibility to obtain foreign exchange. Other 
indicators are related to the management of the economy as a whole, while a third groups of 
indicators are related to the performance of the economy as a whole. However, the last group of 
indicators is less important. 
Total combined country risk analyses 
The total combined risk analyses tries to give an overall view of the creditworthiness of the 
specific country. To establish the overall country risk the political and transfers risk (in terms of 
liquidity and solvability) are aggregated. Krayenbuehl states that 
"in the overall index (...), political risk is often assigned a 30 per cent weight. Within 
transfer risk, the liquidity part can account for up to 50 per cent of the weight. "43 
Several of the weighting systems commonly used are presented in tables 3.2 to 3.4. 
42
 Krayenbuehl, 1985, p.57. 
43
 Krayenbuehl, 1985, p 70. 
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Table 3.1 
Indicators of the liquidity-index 
Indicator Weight 
Reserves/imports 40% 
Debtservice/exports 20% 
Big loss of foreign reserves 10% 
Recent payments experiments 10% 
IMF credits/quota 20% 
Source: Krayenbuehl, 1985, p 68. 
Table 3.2 
Indicator Weight % 
1. Per cent change in consumer prices: 
(a) most recent year 5 
(b) five-year average 5 
(c) most recent year/five-year average 5 
2. Per cent change in money supply (Ml) 1 year/ 
per cent change in real GDP (five-year average) 10 
3. Change in central bank financing government/ 
monetary base (most recent yaer) 5 
4. Purchasing power parity 5 
5. Growth of exports: 
(a) most recent year 10 
(b) four-year average 10 
6. Exports/GDP (most recent year) 10 
7. Debt/exports (most recent year) 15 
8. Savings/GDP (four year average) 10 
9. Growth of real per capita GDP (five-year average) 10 
Source: Krayenbuehl (1985) 
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Table 3.3 
Approximate 
we ighting % 
l. Legal considerations 10 
2. Political considerations 25 
3. Economie considerations: 
- Power of the government (e.g. a Danish-type 
minority government which find it difficult te > 
introducé unpopular measurescompared with a 
British first-past-the post-system) 6 
- Assement of currentplans for the economy; 
feasibility of development plans, main bottle-
necks, etc,- resource base - natural an human 
resources, etc. 15 
- Recent events and present state of the economy 
GNP growth 0 3 
Rate of inflation 0 6 
Government budget position 0 6 
Money supply growth 0 3 
Current account balance of payments 0 3 
Unemployment 0 6 
Level of external debt 1 2 
Debt service ratio 1 2 
Latest date of published statistics 0 9 
- Future prospects for the economy if present 
6 
trends and policies continue 
GNP growth 0 7 
Rate of inflation 1 3 
Government budget position 2 0 
Money supply growth 0 7 
Current account balance of payments 2 0 
Unemployment 1 3 
Level of external debt 2 5 
Debt service ratio 2 5 
- Ability of the country to correct adverse impli 
13 
cations of present binds and to withstand unfore-
seen shocks (vulnerability) 
Imports as a proportion of GDP 0 7 
Exports as a proportion of GDP 0 7 
Diversification of imports by category and by 
geografical area 4 6 
Diversification of imports by category and by 
geografical area 4 6 
Compressibility of imports (i.e. extent to 
which imports consist of 'non-essentials') 6 4 
Vulnerability to the economy to changing 
exports and imports; energy dependance 8 0 
25 
100 
Source: Robinson (on cit. in Krayenbuehl, 1985) 
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Table 3.4 
Commercial banks' attitude to country risk assesment: 
a schedual of factors used in the individual systems 
Measure (1) 
Systems Reviewed 
A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Debt service ratio X X X X X X X X X X X 
Import/Reserves ratio X X X X X X 
Capital/Debt ratio X X X X X 
Income per capita X X X X X X X X X 
Income growth rate X X X X X X X X X X 
Export growth rate X X X X X X X X X 
Export analysis X X X X X X X X X 
Imports/Exports ratio X X X X X X X X X 
Economie diversity X X X X X X 
Export/GNP X X X X X 
Level of IMF Reserve 
ratio X X X X X X X X 
Debt structure X X X X X X 
Inflation/Monetary/ 
Fiscal policy X X X X X X X X X 
Physical resources X X X X X X X 
Debt X X X X X X X X 
Import analysis X X X X X X X 
Basic strenght X X X X X 
Ability to change 
peacefully X X X X X X 
Likeliness of internal 
conflict X X X X X X X 
Policies of ruling 
group X X X X X 
Philosophy of ruling 
group X X X 
Ability of government 
officers X X X X X X 
Flexibility of the 
political systems X X 
External relations X X X X X 
Minority groups X X X X X X X 
Religious problems X X X X X 
Unemployment X X X X 
External ethnic 
problems X X X X X 
Government support X X X 
Type of system X X X na X 
Opposition groups X X X X 
Wealth disparity X X X X 
1. In some cases similar measures f rom to or more syst ems 
are grouped together under one heading. 'Income per 
capita' and 'Income growth' are taken in terms o f either 
GNP or GDP. 
Key to the systems reviewed 
A Feder/Ross: World Bank (G. Feder and l K. Ross; 1977) 
B C.M. North, University o f South Carolina, Ex First 
National Bank of Chicago 
C J.N. Robinson, Chase Manhattan Bank NA (1981) 
D K. Janoeri, Union Bank o f Switserland (1980) 
E Amsterdam and Rotterdam Bank NV (1981) 
F Business International Country Risk Assessment Service 
(1981) 
G P.J. Nagy, Bank of Montreal (1978) 
H H.R. Heller, Bank of America (1980) 
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Table 3.4, continued 
I P.Gutmann, National Westminster Bank Lmd (1980) 
J America Express Bank (1980) 
K A. van Agtmael, Bankers Trust Co (197S) 
L C. Johnson, Lloyds Bank (1985) 
Source: Bird (1989) 
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Section 4 Influence of CFA franc zone membership on risk analysis 
Introduction 
In this section we (theoretically) investigate how CFA franc zone membership influences country 
risk assessment. As we showed in the previous section, country risk analysis mostly consists of 
evaluation of some social/political and economie indicators. The CFA franc zone membership can 
possibly effect these indicators in three basically different, non-exclusive marmers: 
1. The CFA franc zone membership directly influences the value of the indicator. 
2. The CFA franc zone membership influences the meaning attached to a specific value of 
some indicator. 
3. The CFA franc zone membership influences the perceptions on policy with respect to this 
indicator by the credit institutions ouside the zone. 
In the first case, the CFA membership alters the value of an indicator. A possible example is that 
CFA franc zone membership may have a decreasing influence on inflation. 
In the second case some indicators of a CFA franc zone member country can take on 
values which in "normal" cases would be considered critical without (in this specific case) being 
so. This is especially the case for those indicators which focus on liquidity problems; because of 
the guaranteed convertibility of the CFA franc liquidity problems will not likely escalate into 
default.44 In general, for the interpretation of a certain value of an indicator to alter, CFA 
membership should influence the "mechanism" behind the relation between the indicator and 
higher likelihood of default. 
With regard to the third possibility, some indicators are perceptions about policy and 
likely policy changes. As the CFA franc zone decreases the degrees of freedom for economie 
policy, there will be less uncertainty about future policy. This is especially the case for announced 
anti-inflatory policy; this will obtain more credibility in a CFA franc zone member than for a non-
CFA franc zone member, as low inflation (comparable with France's rate of inflation) is a 
necessary precondition for continuation of CFA franc zone membership. Similarly, the fixed peg 
to the French franc is more credible for a CFA-member than an announcement of a fixed peg by a 
non CFA franc zone country, as the cost of a possible devaluation will be much higher for a CFA 
franc zone member. 
This suggests that CFA franc zone membership can be used as a device for Financial Signalling 
by the Government, as CFA franc zone membership enables a developing country in Africa to 
signal that it will follow some specific policy, enhancing the observed creditworthiness, and 
hence, enhancing the opportunities to obtain foreign loans. 
In the next section we investigate for each of the indicators mentioned in the previous section 
whether CFA franc zone membership (theoretically) should influence the indicators, in any of the 
manners described above. If there is no influence in the marmer indicated, we give our arguments 
in case this is not self-evident; otherwise we, just skip it. If possible, we combine our theoretical 
discussion with results from empirical literature. We concentrate on a fixed debt to GDP ratio, 
and invoke the c.p. condition throughout. Subsequently, we investigate whether CFA franc zone 
membership will enhance creditworthiness. The analysis is summarized in table 4.1. 
44
 It should be noted that CFA countries can fulfïl their obligations in two basically different ways: By payment out of 
own foreign currency income, or by exchanging CFA Francs for French Francs. In the latter case, the balance of the 
operations account (of the CAMA or of the WAMU, depending on the country under consideration) should be positive. Only 
if this is the case, the meaning attached to the liquidity indicator will be influenced. 
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1. Internal economie indicators 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
1. The GDP per capita within the zone is on average two times higher than in the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.45 Of course, this may be just a fluke, without any causal relation. 
On further thought, three forces appear, which work in opposite directions: 
Lower rates of inflations (see below) will (c.p.) limited exchange rate risk attract more 
investment, and therefore cause a higher growth of the GDP in the long term; 
CFA countries lose their ability to stimulate the economy by increasing the supply of 
money, which may cause underemployment of production capacity, lowering GDP per 
capita; 
CFA countries lose the possibility to devaluate their currency in order to stimulate exports 
by increasing the competitiveness of the country. This factor is increasingly important in 
the last few years after the devaluation of Ghanese and Nigerian currency, which has 
increased the competitiveness of exports from these two countries relative to exports from 
the CFA countries. 
Summarizing, on theoretical grounds it is not possible to teil whether CFA franc 
zone membership will increase GDP per capita in general. 
2. As there is no clear mechanism which connects a higher GDP per capita with lower 
country risk,46 it is difficult to teil whether CFA membership should exert any influence 
on the meaning attached to a particular value of GDP. Therefore, it seems improbable that 
CFA membership will have any influence on country risk assessment. 
3. Influence on perception is essentially only important in those cases that an indicator is 
directly related to policy decisions, as is the case for domestic money supply, exchange 
rate policy, etc. As the GDP per capita is not a direct function of policy, CFA 
membership has no influence on perceptions on relevant policy decisions regarding GDP 
per capita. For the same reason, perceptions of policies with respect to some specific 
indicator is not relevant for most of the indicators used in country risk analysis. 
Economie growth per capita 
1. As discussed above, CFA franc zone membership will cause higher investment, while at 
the same time reducing the possibilities to influence competitivity by devaluation. We 
conclude that CFA membership will increase economie growth, with a possible exception 
for those cases that devaluation in competitor countries decrease competitivity to such a 
degree, that the overall assessment should be negative. 
2. This indicator influences the repayment capacity of a country, with higher growth (c.p.) 
meaning better repayment capabilities. The CFA membership has no influence on this 
mechanism, so that the meaning attached to this factor will remain unaffected. 
Investment to GDP ratio 
45
 Lane and Page (1991) p.18. 
46
 See Krayenbuehl (1985) pp.48-49. Nevertheless, this indicator is traditionally used in country risk assessment. 
Presumably, this indicator is used because in case of problems with repayment it is possible to increase the repayment 
capacity by decreasing non-necessary imports. If this is the case, GDP per capita is a proxy for the compressibility ratio. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Feder en Just (1977) found that higher GDP per capita is related with a lower chance 
of delay in repayment. 
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1. Reduction of the rate of inflation, reduction of exchange rate risk and reduction of 
uncertainty regarding policy will increase the attractiveness of investments within the 
zone. It should be noted that devaluation elsewhere after 1985 caused a reduction in the 
competitiveness of the zone, reducing the attractiveness of the zone for investment. 
Therefore, we observe a decrease in the investment to GDP ratio after 1985. 
2. The investment to GDP ratio influences growth, which influences country risk. This 
causal chain is unaffected by the CFA membership and its institutions, so that the meamng 
attached to a specific value of this indicator will remain unaltered. 
Rate of Inflation 
1. The CFA countries should have rates of inflations comparable to France's. This is not 
directly formalised in the rules of the zone (the restrictions on credit expansion are meant 
to influence the balance on the operations account), but at the same time a necessary 
precondition for survival of the CFA franc zone, and is quite strictly adhered to. 
Therefore, inflation is low relative to the other African countries. 
2. The rate of inflation influences investment behaviour as well as international competitivity. 
A high rate of inflation will deteriorate the international competitiveness of the country, 
decreasing export and increasing imports, which will negatively affect the repayment 
capability of the country. Most countries are able to combat the negative consequences of 
a high rate of inflation on the balance of payments by a devaluation of their currency. As 
this possibility does not exist for the CFA franc zone countries, a high rate of inflation 
should be considered more critical than for a non-member. 
Very high rates of inflation should be considered even more critical, as 
membership of the CFA franc zone will be in danger of discontinuation. 
3. Membership of the CFA franc zone implies that a country will be committed to a policy 
directed to low rates of inflation, comparable with that of France. The credibility of policy 
directed to low rates of inflation will be higher for a CFA franc zone member than for a 
non-member. Therefore, the perceptions regarding relevant policy are influenced by CFA 
franc zone membership. 
Budgetary Deficit 
1. In the CFA franc zone, there are no norms regarding the budget deficits. However, there 
are restrictions on the credit the government can obtain: the maximum equals 20% of the 
government receipts of the previous year. Large budgetary deficits should therefore partly 
be financed on the international financial markets. The interest costs associated herewith 
are presumably enough to prevent explosive growth of the budgetary deficit. 
2. Normally, budgetary deficits are positively related with country risk, because of the 
possibility that these will be financed monetary. Budgetary deficits are viewed as 
precursors of increasing rates of inflation. This specific risk is not so high in CFA 
countries, as monetary financing is statutory limited (see above). However, because the 
budgetary deficits should (partly) be financed on the international financial markets, the 
total foreign debt will increase. This effect will be monitored by other indicators, while 
the future higher rate of inflation in the non-CFA countries will be noticed only on a later 
date. We conclude that given equal external debt to GDP and equal rates of inflation, a 
high value of the budgetary deficits will be seen as less critical than in a non-CFA 
country. 
3. As described under 1. above, budgetary deficits should for a large part be financed 
internationally. It will therefore become more difficult to finance a high budgetary deficits. 
Therefore, the credit institutions in the West will expect lower budgetary deficits in the 
future than for non-CFA countries. 
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2. External economie indicators 
Diversification of export 
1. Diversification of the export nas two dimensions: diversification of the products and 
services exported, and diversification of the countries to which is exported. Membership 
of the CFA franc zone implies a reduction in the exchange rate risk with the EC, while 
the exchange rate risk for trade with France is even completely eliminated. This will lead 
to a concentration of export to the EC and especially France. Therefore diversification is 
probably slightly reduced. 
However, it seems that the diversification of goods exported is unaffected by CFA 
Franc zone membership. 
2. The meaning of a certain value for diversification of products and services exported 
remains unaffected by CFA membership. A higher concentration of exports to certain 
countries should be viewed less negatively than normal, as the countries in questions are 
characterised by high economie stability. 
Exportratio 
1. Because exchange rate risk for export with the EC is much reduced, it is likely that 
exports and the export ratios of CFA countries will be higher than without the CFA 
membership. In general, CFA members are characterised by higher export ratios.47 
2. Eventually, the capacity to repay debts is determined by the ability to earn foreign 
exchange. Ultimately, this depends on the export possibilities of the country in question. 
A high export ratio generally implies a higher repayment capacity; this is equally true for 
CFA zone countries. 
Ratio of total foreign debt to export 
1. CFA zone membership exerts two opposing forces on this ratio. Exports are higher for 
CFA zone countries, because of elimination of exchange rate risk. However, the 
requirement that a high percentage of the budgetary deficits should be financed on the 
international financial markets exerts a positive pressure on total foreign debt. Indeed, the 
average total foreign debt of CFA countries is twice as high as in non-CFA countries.48 
As these forces pull in different directions, it is not possible to conclude on 
theoretical grounds what will happen to this ratio. However, from the statistics it appears 
that the CFA countries generally have a lower ratio of total foreign debt to exports than 
other comparable, non-CFA countries.49 
Debt Service Ratio 
1. The influence of CFA membership on export income has already been dealt with. The 
debt service is affected by a number of factors, including the unit cost of capital, amount 
of foreign debt, time to maturity, percentage of concessionary loans, etc. As indicated 
above, CFA membership will generally imply higher level of foreign debt. There seems to 
be no influence of CFA membership on the date to maturity. The percentage of 
concessionary loans is influenced by two opposing forces: greater ease of access to non-
IMF (1990) p.33. 
Lane and Page (1991) p. 18. 
MF (1990) p.33. 
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concessionary loans on the capital markets, while the historical linkage to France results in 
relatively much concessionary loans from France. 
On theoretical grounds it is not possible to predict which of these opposite forces 
will prevail. Empirically, we observe that the debt service ratio is lower for CFA 
countries than for non-CFA countries.50 
Arrears on interest pavments 
1. The convertibility of the CFA franc implies that arrears on interest payments will be less 
common for CFA countries. 
2. Arrears in payments for CFA countries are more critical than for non-CFA countries, 
because with a well functioning CFA franc zone, these arrears should be easily avoided. 
Percentage of short term debt. 
2. A high percentage of short term debt generally implies a higher country risk, as these 
loans can be retracted at short notice, causing severe liquidity problems. Within the CFA 
zone, this is of no importance, as short term liquidity problems can be solved by using the 
convertibility of the CFA franc.51 
Import coverage 
1. Because of the guaranteed convertibility of the CFA franc, it is possible to use low 
reserves, so that the coverage ratio need not be high.52 Therefore, import coverage is 
likely to be low for CFA countries. 
2. As the reserves of the CFA countries are pooled, the value of this indicator loses its 
normal meaning. For CFA countries, it is the possibility to use the CFA franc which is of 
importance, not the level of reserves itself. 
Ratio of short term debt to reserves 
1. As discussed directly above CFA countries need to hold only very low amounts of 
reserves. Therefore, this ratio will have a high value for the CFA countries. 
2. As discussed above, because of pooling of reserves this ratio will lose its normal 
significance. 
Use of the credit facilities of the IMF 
1. CFA countries less often need to rely on the credit facilities of the IMF, as they are able 
to use the convertibility of the French franc, and they can make use of other countries' 
reserves, as these are pooled. 
2. As it should be easy for CFA countries to avoid use of the IMF facilities, its actual use 
should be considered a red herring. 
Balance at the Bank of International Settlements 
All remarks made for use of the credit facilities of the IMF are equally valid here. 
50
 IMF (1990) p.33. 
51
 Of course, the total balance on the operation account should be positive. 
52
 Lane and Page (1991) p.17. 
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Market discounts on debt 
This indicator is not relevant for the CFA countries, as there is no market for second hand debts 
of these countries. 
3 Social-political indicators 
Evaluation of domestic policy 
1. This is a general indicator, which assesses the appropriateness of domestic policy choices 
of the CFA countries. The factor is influenced by increases in the costs of inappropriate 
policies, reduction in degrees of freedom and the formal influence of France. Therefore, 
we may assume that domestic policy will be more favourably evaluated. 
3. As appears from the discussion under 1. here it is the perception which is directly 
influenced. 
Risk of internal conflicts 
This indicator is not influenced by CFA membership. 
Risk of international conflicts 
This indicator is not influenced by CFA membership. 
Summary 
Some values of internal indicators are positively influenced: inflation and budgetary deficits are 
both lower than without CFA franc zone membership. Also, some values of external indicators 
(debt service ratio, export ratio, payment arrears, use of IMF facilities, balance at the BIS) are 
positively influenced, and the evaluation of domestic policy will be much more favourable. All 
these factors seem to work to decrease country risk as found by country risk assessment; however, 
some other indicators (coverage ratio, ratio short term debt to reserves) are negatively influenced, 
while in other cases (GDP per capita, economie growth, diversification of exports) the effects are 
mixed. Furthermore, it should be noted that these effects are sometimes partly negated, as the 
meaning attached to a specific value of an indicator will be changed by CFA membership. The 
various effects as hypothesized in this section are summarized in table 4.1. 
Furthermore, we like to digress on the influence of the recent devaluation of the CFA franc on 
country risk analysis. The conclusions based on reduction of exchange rate risk with France and 
the rest of the EC should be qualified, as it is proven that there really still exists exchange rate 
risk. How this affects country risk analysis is also indicated in table 4.1. As speculations about a 
possible devaluation of the CFA franc are longstanding, it is likely that country risk analysis has 
been influenced in the indicated way for some time. 
Conclusion 
From the discussion above it is not clear whether CFA franc zone membership will lead to lower 
observed country risk for the CFA franc zone members, as the effects on the indicators used is 
mostly positive, but sometimes negative. However, a signalling effect (CFA franc zone 
membership influences the anticipations and perceptions in the West about future policy decisions 
by the countries involved) could theoretically exist and could empirically be relevant. Whether 
CFA franc zone membership indeed increases creditworthiness (as would seem more likely, given 
the discussion above) can only be decided after empirical analysis, which will be the subject of a 
36 
subsequent paper. 
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Table 4 .1 
Way indicator is changed 
Indicator 1 2 3 
GDP/capita + /- lp 0 n 
Growth GDP/Capita +/(-) 1P 0 n 
Investment/GDP + /(-) lp 0 n 
Rate of Inflation + - Y/ + 
Budgetary Deficit + + y- + 
Diversification of Exports -/o + n 
Export/GDP +/- +,e lp 0 n 
Total Debt/Export +/- +,e lp 0 n 
Debt Service Ratio +/- +,e 0 n 
Payment Arrears + - n 
Perc. Short term Debt 0 + n 
Coverage Ratio - + n 
Short Term Debt/Reserves - + n 
Use Credit Facilities IMF + - n 
Balance at the BIS + - n 
Market Discounts on Debt nr nr nr 
Evaluation of Domestic 
Policy + 0 y,+ 
Risk of Internal Conflicts 0 0 n 
Risk of External Conflicts 0 0 n 
+ = positive influence; country risk decreases 
= negative influence; country risk increases 
(-) = situations with negative influence pos sible 
0 = neutral 
+/- = influence unclear 
y = yes (3) 
n = no (3) 
+,e = empirically positive influence 
-,e = empirically negative influence 
+/(-) = mostly positive influence ; may be negative 
0/- = neutral or negative 
nr = not relevant 
lp = evaluation less positive if devaluation is considered possible 
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Section 5 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the reasons for participation of the CFA member countries in the CFA 
franc zone. As in the literature, we found that theories which are normally used to explain 
existence of and participation in monetary unions are not satisfactorily in the CFA case. Several 
alternative explanations have been considered, and another possible explanation has been offered: 
membership of the CFA franc zone can be used as "Financial signalling by the Government"; as a 
method to ameliorate its country's score in a country risk assessment. This is obviously attractive, 
as inflows of capital are related with country risk assessment, given same rate of returns. 
On a theoretical level, membership in the CFA franc zone may exert a possible influence on 
country risk assessment in a number of different ways. 
First, membership may directly influence the score on some indicator of country risk. We have 
argued that levels of indicators are probably favourably affected for the following indicators: 
growth of GDP per capita, degree of investment, rate of inflation, the budgetary deficit, payment 
arrears, use of credit facilities of the IMF, and balance held at BIS. Some other indicators are 
probably disfavourably affected; arguably, this is the case for the coverage ratio and short term 
debt to reserves. 
Second, a specific score of an indicator might be different interpreted in case of membership of 
the CFA zone. The interpretation of a specific score are probably positively changed for the 
following indicators: budgetary deficit, diversification of exports, percentage of short term debt-
coverage ratio, and short term debt to reserves. Negatively affected are the interpretation of same 
scores on rate of inflation, payment arrears, use of credit facilities of the IMF, and balance held at 
BIS. 
Third, expectations regarding governments' policies are favourable changed with respect to the 
following indicators: rate of inflation, budgetary deficit, and quality of domestic policies in 
general. 
The preceding analysis suggests that membership in the CFA franc zone could historically have 
exerted a positive influence on the possibility to attract foreign capital. However, it is difficult to 
assess whether this is still the case after this year's devaluation of the CFA franc. 
The present paper is of course theoretical in nature. An empirical analysis of the hypotheses 
offered in this paper has not been done yet, and promises to be interesting. An empirical analysis 
of the influence of CFA zone membership will be provided in our next analysis of this topic. 
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Appendix Some background information about the devaluation of the CFA franc 
On january 12, 1994 in France, the 13 members of the CFA franc zone as well as the Comoros 
decided to adjust the parity of the CFA franc exchange rate and the Comoros franc respectively. 
The CFA franc devalued 50%, while the Comoros franc devalued one third against the French 
franc. This is the first parity change since the creation of the CFA franc zone. 
After years of speculation and rumours about the possibility of an devaluation this finally 
happened. In the second half of the '80 the economie and financial situation of the CFA countries 
deteriorated significantly. Since that time speculation against the CFA franc as well as capital 
flight started. To stem the huge outflow of capital through the export of banknotes, the African 
authorities suspended on august 2, 1993 to repurchase any CFA franc bank note in circulation 
outside the territories of the CFA franc zone. The convertibility of the CFA franc into French 
franc remained, with this exception, unchanged. This was the prelude to the devaluation half a 
year later. After the devaluation an anonymous economist was quoted in the Financial Times 
saying: 
"[that the devaluation was the] most foretold and least well prepared devaluation in 
economie history". 
Until 1985 the CFA franc zone served its members well assuring low rates of inflation, reasonable 
and sometimes high economie growth as well as a reasonable high rate of (foreign) investment. 
Since 1985 the African countries got economical and financial problems. The economie growth 
was low (some years even negative), export growth was low, wages high, low levels of (direct) 
investments, liquidity problems of the commercial banks (some bankruptcies), and high national 
and international public debts. Two major external shocks caused the deterioration, which finally 
resulted in the devaluation. 
First, the external competitiveness of the zone weakened as a result of the nomina! appreciation of 
the French franc against currencies of the zone's major trading partners and a lack of appropriate 
policy response by African franc zone members to this appreciation. Since 1986 France fixed its 
currency to the German mark within the framework of the EMS. This was a totally different 
exchange rate policy from that of early '80s. In those years the French franc devaluated several 
times in an effort to improve France's competitiveness. 
This policy change occurred at the same time as start of the spectacular fall of the US dollar. 
Because most of the export prices of the CFA franc countries are expressed in US dollars, their 
export receipts declined in terms of CFA francs. Finally some neighbouring countries as Ghana 
and Nigeria, competitors on the world market, devalued their national currencies several times 
since 1986. The resulting appreciation of the CFA franc caused the zone to lose the benefit of its 
natural comparative advantages. 
Second, the zone's terms of trade deteriorated, owing mainly to the fall in world market prices for 
its major exports (cocoa, coffee and petroleum in particular) and to the increase in import prices. 
Political resistance against devaluation 
For many years, the World Bank and the IMF advocated a realignment of the CFA franc. Because 
of social, political and economical reasons it lasted until 1994 before the CFA franc devalued. 
First there were conflicting interest between the member countries as well as within the member 
countries itself. The overvaluation of the CFA currency benefitted those CFA countries that were 
heavily dependent on foreign imports (i.e. Chad). Because of the overvaluation these imports were 
relatively cheap. On the other hand, the overvaluation was a disadvantage to the exporting 
countries (especially Ivory coast and Cameroon). 
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Within the national boundaries the overvaluation benefitted the African elite and its civil servants, 
mostly living in the urban areas, as they could buy cheaply imported luxury goods. These groups 
traditionally support the government. Some countries were afraid of riots as a possible 
consequence of devaluations. (And indeed, in some countries riots broke out after the 
devaluation). 
Second, France was for a long time also a major opponent against devaluation. One should know 
that the zone was not just strictly monetary, but it has political and military aspects as well. The 
CFA franc zone guaranteed mutual support in case of attacks from outside the zone. In practice 
this meant that France sent military help to aid allied regimes. Above this, French companies 
favoured the currency-alignment as it insured them of a less risky acces to the CFA franc zone-
market. 
Finally, because the currency peg worked pretty well in its influence on for example economie 
growth and inflation until 1986, one can imagine strong opposition against a devaluation. 
Influence of the devaluation on the country risk analysis 
The influence of the devaluation on country risk and its perception is difficult to predict. The first 
short term effect of a devaluation is that it makes (necessary) imports more expensive. This will 
harm those countries which are heavily dependent of imports such as Mali, Chad and Niger. (To 
overcome this, the IMF and the World Bank donated 2 billion US$.) Besides this, the 
international debts (in local currencies) will doublé. This will cause much harm to those countries 
which are already highly internationally indebted (Ivory Coast). 
The medium and long term effects will depend on the implementation of a macro-economie 
stabilisation policy and the dynamic abilities of the CFA franc zone countries to adjust to and 
profït from the improved export possibilities. 
The realignment, accompanied with measures to control demand and foster a recovery in supply, 
may lead to considerable increases in productivity, in both traditional and non-traditional sectors. 
This strategy may enable zone member countries to regain a level of competitiveness that will 
allow them to benefit fully from their comparative advantages. The realignment can lead to a shift 
from the less growth-oriented sectors (which are often artificially protected) to the more dynamic 
and competitive sectors of the economy. The agricultural sector might be the first to benefit from 
such an operation. 
Furthermore the realignment may stimulate export growth, because the CFA products may 
become cheaper on the world market. Especially the exporting countries, like Cameroon, Ivory 
coast, Ghana will benefit mostly. Direct foreign investment will also be more attractive. 
International structural aid may increase, because the realignment was an prerequisite of the IMF 
for providing structural aid to the CFA zone. This multilateral aid is a prerequisite for debt 
restructuring in the Paris Club by the zone's international creditors. France has already remitted 
debts of a total amount of Ff 25 billion. Debt arrangements are especially important for the richer 
countries in this area, like Gabon, Cameroon, Congo and Senegal, because they have the highest 
international debts relative to GDP. 
It is exactly this group of countries that did violate the rules of the CFA most strongly. In the '80s 
they kept an almost permanent deficit on their operations account. Partly because of the actions of 
this group of countries, the functioning of the systems was put under severe stress. On the other 
hand, these countries have the benefit of a relatively well developed and export oriented economy. 
With a lower external debt for this group of countries the CFA system may get a good second 
start to perform as it is supposed to, as this group determines to a large extent the economie 
performance of the CFA franc zone. 
41 
Literature 
Aghevli, B.B., M.S. Knan en P.J. Montiel (1991), Exchange Rate Policy in Developing 
Countries: Some Analytical Issues, Occasional Paper, 78, IMF, Washington DC, 1991. 
Bakker A.F.P. (1990), De Europese monetaire eenwording in een stroomversnelling, 
Internationale spectator, p. 654-660, october 1990. 
Bird G. (1989), New approaches to country risk assement, in Commercial Banklending & Third 
World debt, p. 33-47, MacMillan, London 1989. 
Boughton, J.M. (1991), The CFA franc zone: Currency Union and Monetary Standard, IMF 
Working Paper, No. 91, 1991. 
Devarajan, S., J. de Melo (1987), Evaluating Participation in African Monetary Unions: A 
Statistical Analysis of the CFA zones, World Development, p. 483-496, 1987. 
Devarajan, S., J. de Melo (1990), Membership in the CFA zone: Odyssean Journey or Trojan 
Horse ?, World Bank, Policy, Research and External Affairs Working Paper, WPS 482, 
augustus 1990. 
EIbadawi, I. en N. Majd (1992), Fixed parity of exchange rate and economie performance in the 
CFA zone (a comparative study), World Bank, Policy, Research and External Affairs 
Working Paper, WPS 830, januari 1992. 
Fleming, J.M. (1971), On Exchange Rate Unification, Economie Journal, p. 369-380, september 
1971. 
Frank Jr, CR. en W.R. Cline (1971), Measurement of debt servicing capacity: an 
appllication of discriminant analysis, Journal of International Economics, p. 327-344, 
1971. 
Grauwe, P. de, D. Hermans en E. van Rompuy (1976), Naar een relance van de Europese 
Monetaire Unie ?, Tijdschrift voor economie en management, p. 91-121, 1976. 
Honohan, P. (1990), Monetary Cooperation in the CFA zone, World Bank, Policy, Research and 
External affairs Working paper 389, Washington, 1990. 
International Monetary Fund (1990), A review of the CFA franc arrangements, IMF, 1990. 
Ishiyama, Y. (1975), The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas: A Survey, IMF Staff Papers, No. 
22, p. 344-383, 1975. 
Krayenbuehl, T.E. (1985), Country Risk; Assessment and Monitoring, Woodhead-Faulkner, 
Cambridge (UK), 1985. 
Lane, CE. en S. Page (1991), Differences in Economie Performance between franc zone and 
Other Sub-Saharan African Countries, Working Paper, No. 43, ODI, 1991. 
Mundell, R.A. (1961), A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, American Economie Review, 
p. 657-665, 1961. 
Naert, F. (1981), De voordelen van een monetaire unie: terecht vergeten ?, Maandschrift 
42 
